I. INTRODUCTION
Geographical Positioning Systems (GPS) technology has become prevalent in many areas of life and increasingly continues to become an important technological function in many electronic devices. This technology is generally used to provide location awareness and in turn provides particular user services. A similar technology (cell site analysis) has also existed in mobile phones, which indirectly allows such devices to be tracked to within 10m of their use at any given point in time. One of the more popular applications of GPS technology is in Satellite Navigation (SatNav) based systems wherein GPS systems interface with applications which guide travellers through a journey. Such systems take various forms, however the more popular are the built-in (factory-fit) systems and mobile devices.
These technologies have played an important part in the investigation of incidents, particularly where tracking the location of individuals is a key factor. We refer to this area of investigation as geo-positional forensics.
Research into geo-positional forensics can be divided into three categories:
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Challenging the Reliability of iPhone Geo-tags Harjinder Singh Lallie (1) , David Benford (2) ( However, there are clear issues and problems in certain aspects of GPS systems technology which need to be resolved and presented to the digital forensics community. Some of the legal challenges in Geo-positional forensics are quite new, for instance, the reliability of evidence extracted from GPS memory systems can be questioned for a number of reasons:
• Accuracy and reliability of GPS data • GPS Jamming [1, 2] • Improper legal engineering
The first of these issues is the subject of the present study wherein we question the reliability of geo-tags which may be contained within photographs taken with an iPhone. Geo-tags are geographic coordinates which are stored as metadata -or more specifically Exif (Exchangeable Image format) data, which points particularly to the geographical coordinates of the location where the photograph was taken. Note that we use the term metadata to refer collectively to the geo-tags (which are contained within the Exif data) and the MAC timestamps (which are recorded within the operating system file attributes for the file in question). For the geo-tags to be recorded in this way, the location services function has to have been enabled.
Investigators should be aware that there are a number of other issues (outside of the scope of the present study) related to the reliability of GPS related data. Some of these inaccuracies of GPS data are explored by Strawn [3] and are addressed in part by technologies such as Assisted GPS (AGPS) [4] [5] [6] . GPS receivers can be 'spoof-attacked' wherein a signal is generated making the GPS receiver "believe that it is in motion" [7] and in return result in unreliable coordinates which may be recorded within the Exif data. The devices and the data contained therein can be tampered with and that in turn could lead to claims against the data storage systems being provably secure [7] .
In the present study, a number of interviews with police digital forensic officers were conducted in order to establish and explore cases in which geo-tags from iPhones had been used. Through this research we were able to explore a number of cases for instance where:
• Indecent images of a child contained geotags which were used to identify the location of where the images were believed to have been taken. • Pictures were found of a building believed to be used to grow drug plants hydroponically. The police were able to trace the building and subsequently the group alleged to be growing the plants from the geo-tags within the pictures.
The present study demonstrates that the geo-tags contained within pictures taken with an iPhone are unreliable. We present two methods whereby the geo-tags can be forged and in doing so be nearly impossible to trace. We show that on modifying the coordinates, the resulting change in MAC (Modified/Accessed/Created timestamps) can be altered easily so as to make the modification impossible to trace.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows: In section II we detail the equipment and software used for the two experiments, we also state the limitations of the experiments. In section III we present and explain the first experiment in which we extract, modify and then reinstate an image to an iPhone. In section IV we present an alternative method of achieving the same, this time by using the iTunes backup facility.
II. HARDWARE, SOFTWARE AND LIMITATIONS
These experiments were performed on a jailbroken Apple iPhone 3Gs 16GB. The device had an operating system version 4.1 (8B117) and a firmware with version 05. 14 The specialist software and equipment used was as follows:
•Evigator TAGView v1.1.0 [8] •Google Earth 5.2.1.1588 [9] •PhotoME Photo Metadata Editor Version 0.79R17 (Build 856) [10] •Irfanview 4.27 with plug-in"iv_misc.zip" [11] •Micro Systemation .XRY Logical Software 5.3
and associated hardware [12] • SQLite Database browser Version 2.0b1 [13] •SQLite3.exe [14] •SQLite Expert Personal [15] These experiments altered two items of data: geographic coordinates (namely longitude and latitude) and the MAC timestamps. Prior to and after each experiment these metadata were verified using two different tools; no other metadata was altered during the course of these experiments.
Some of the software used above (excluding in particular XRY) is not verified for use in digital evidence extraction. This means, for instance, that the use of tools such as Irfanview may not be readily accepted in a court of law and we cannot be sure of any adverse effects that use of the software may have on the systems/files. However we can be sure that the two items of data we specifically modified were not in any other way adversely affected other than in our modification as described herein.
Both our experiments were conducted on a jailbroken iPhone. In our experiments, it proved impossible to mount the phone on an Ubuntu system unless it was jailbroken. The experiment was repeated with a non-jailbroken iPhone running iOS 4.2, but wherever mounting was necessary, Windows was used to mount the phone. In this case the result was identical, thereby proving that the phone does not have to be jailbroken for the modifications to have been made.
We believe that there are mechanisms (such as those described by Bernd Marienfeldt [18] ) wherein we may be able to mount the iPhone on an Ubuntu system without having jailbroken it in the first place.
III. EXPERIMENT 1: MANIPULATING THE GEO-TAGS USING EXTERNAL SOFTWARE/HARDWARE
The objective of the first experiment was to demonstrate an effective process that modifies geo-tags within the metadata of images contained on an iPhone, and leaves no evidence of the change having taken place. In the first experiment, the image is modified externally and then uploaded back onto the iPhone.
In most digital forensic examinations, the examined device must be isolated from the network as per the ACPO guidelines [19] . This is generally achieved by cloning the SIM card or the use of a Faraday box or similar shielding method. In this case the device was not isolated as the call records and SMS data (the only data that could be modified inadvertently) are outside the scope of this project. As such, the iPhone can be mounted using any operating system (in our case Ubuntu and Windows). The geo-tags for instance cannot be modified inadvertently if the iPhone is receiving signals.
A. Record of Exif Data
A JPEG image that had been taken by the iPhone's camera was selected for modification. This image had to have been taken with the location services function enabled and its coordinates needed to be intact. The relevant Exif data and MAC times were recorded and confirmed using two different applications: Micro Systemation XRY [12] (Figure 1 Following this, a logical extraction was performed using XRY and the image was selected and exported to external storage media.
B. Modification of Exif Data
The latitude and longitude coordinates of the JPG on the external storage system were changed using PhotoME [10] which (amongst various other functions) allows for the modification of Exif data. These were changed to point to 77.055961 and 38.870988 respectively (Figure 3 ).
The reader should be aware of the various points at which the MAC times have changed throughout this and other experiments. These are as follows:
• When a file is backed up using the iTunes facility, through XRY or manual copying • When the file is modified using any of the utilities specified herein
The MAC times need to be changed back to the original timestamps after any modifications to the geo-data are made. To achieve this, we used a utility called Irfanview [11] (Figure 5 ) which allowed for the modification of this metadata.
C. Verification/Validation
Following modification of the Exif data, we needed to verify the changes. As stated earlier, the approach we took was to use at least two utilities to do this. Furthermore, we analysed the Exif data both before and after copying the modified image back onto the iPhone. Prior to copying the image onto the iPhone, we analysed the image as follows:
• XRY. The image was examined using XRY.
The new Exif data confirmed the latitude/ longitude changes and the examination confirmed that the MAC timestamps had been changed back to the original timestamps.
• PhotoMe. The image was viewed again using PhotoMe which integrates coordinate plotting with Google maps. The Exif coordinates and MAC timestamps confirmed the same. The in-built Google map facility pointed to the new coordinates.
Once the image had been modified it was copied back onto the iPhone (by mounting the iPhone using Ubuntu and copying back to the original directory) and replaced the original image.
A further analysis was conducted to assess whether the MAC timestamps and coordinates had been correctly modified and/or in any way adversely affected when the image was copied back onto the iPhone. The way in which the image metadata was confirmed in this case was as follows:
• iPhone. The modified image was viewed using the Camera Roll → Places, however as we shall see, at this point this still points to the original coordinates and this required a further modification which will also be discussed.
• Through a Windows machine. The iPhone can be mounted using a Windows machine and the image properties accessed thereof from the directory. The Exif data in this case can be viewed as with any normal Windows accessed image by right clicking on the image and selecting properties.
D. Modification of sqlite and plist files on iPhone
Whilst the modification has been correctly reflected in the metadata of the image, the iPhone still displays the original coordinates when viewed through the Camera Roll → Places feature. This is because the iPhone stores data relating to images within an SQL database and a plist (property list), both of which require modification at this point. The entries in these files seemingly override the Exif data.
The plist file is an XML based file which contains information on how the device should display the images listed in the SQLite databases. If info.plist becomes corrupted then some or all of the images may not display correctly or at all. The locations on the iPhone of the relevant files are:
/PhotoData/Photos.sqlite /PhotoData/PhotosAux.sqlite /DCIM/.MISC/Info.plist (a hidden file)
We can verify the contents of these files by mounting the iPhone and accessing the files using a tool such as SQLite Expert Personal [15] (Figure 4) . The info.plist file was extracted using XRY in order to keep a precise record of the contents. Most important in this were the primary keys which determined the order in which images are displayed through the camera roll → places function.
The info.plist file was deleted. This forced the iPhone operating system to recreate the file on rebooting. It does this by traversing the DCIM folder and rebuilding the data. Once recreated, we modified the entries back into the original order. It should be noted at this juncture, that by modifying the plist file, we have inadvertently modified the MAC times and these should be changed in the same manner as we have identified elsewhere. This is something that an investigator should be aware of when analysing the device.
The image Exif data can be validated again using the process previously described to show that the data has not changed from the point we made the changes. Following the process described above, we have managed to modify the metadata within an image without any of the changes being traceable. We now proceed to demonstrate another method whereby this could be achieved by using a normal backup function within iTunes.
IV. EXPERIMENT 2: MANIPULATING THE GEO-TAGS USING APPLE ITUNES
The objective of the second experiment was to prove an effective process through which one can modify geo-tags within the metadata of images using the Apple iTunes backup facility and to subsequently restore the backup to an iPhone. The process should leave no evidence on the iPhone of the modification ever having taken place.
The first two stages of the process are the same as for the previous experiment wherein we examine the device to identify a suitable image (using XRY) and then extract the source image to an external storage system in the same way. Again, we verify the metadata by using two different utilities both before and after modification. A different file from that used in experiment 1 was selected and copied onto an external storage system. The metadata of this file was confirmed and recorded in the same way as in experiment 1. The date and time of the image in this case were 25-11-12 and 17:21:25 respectively and the latitude and longitude were 52.68367 and -1.827667 respectively. Whilst the date would of course be kept the same, the destination coordinates would be modified to be 38.871067 and 77.05555 respectively. 
A. Backing up the iPhone
Following the extraction of the image, the iPhone was backed up using the iTunes feature ( Figure 6 ) and then a copy made of that backup onto an external storage system. The default iTunes application backup directory is normally:
The folder name in this case is 79d479ced 4d925c4bbc5e05fcd22a470d1b76cad. Each file within the backup has a long alphanumeric hex filename and none of these filenames corresponded to the filename that we had extracted using XRY. Furthermore, none of these files had an extension which might indicate the file-type. This was clearly important as the modified image must replace its corresponding file in the iTunes backup. There are at least two ways in which we can identify the target file. One is by performing a header analysis/file signature analysis on each of the files. This can be accomplished by using a hex based file viewer or a tool such as EnCase [20] or FTK (Forensic Toolkit) [21] . An alternative albeit more crude method is as follows:
B. Identifying and modifying the target image
The procedure for modifying the coordinates on the file was exactly the same as followed in experiment 1.
With the modifications having been made to the target JPEG file, it can be renamed to the original filename (i.e. JPG extension removed) and then copied back to the backup directory.
C. Modification of sqlite and plist files in iTunes backup directory
The sqlite and plist files can be modified in exactly the same way as in the first experiment in order to ensure that the image once copied back onto the iPhone displays the modified coordinates. An alternative mechanism however (now that the whole phone has been backed up) is to modify these two files directly within the backup directory. However as we have already established, files in the iTunes backup directory are listed as alphanumeric hex names making it difficult to identify the file to be modified. In order to identify the correct file, we used a utility called iBackupBot [17] which allows specifically for the export of sqlist and plist files.
The sqlite and plist files were selected from the media/Photodata directory and exported to an external storage system. The export with back up information option must be selected ( Figure  7 ) in order to enable the files to be imported after modifying.
The files in our case were saved with the following filenames:
Media_PhotoData_PhotosAux.sqlite.info Media_PhotoData_Photos.sqlite.info Each of these files (sqlist and plist) contain a hash entry which corresponds to the alphanumeric hex name of this file within the iTunes backup folder (see §IV.A above and Figure 8 ). This filename must be recorded and the corresponding files located from within the following directory: Having located the file, the tables are emptied using SQLite Expert Personal, recall that rebooting the iPhone will rebuild the deleted entries based on the data in the Exif tags. This can be achieved by highlighting each table and then selecting the empty table <name> option (through the data tab). Whilst this removes the data from within the tables the database structure remains the same.
The iPhone is now reconnected and we use iBackupBot to restore the backup (File→Restore - Figure 9 ).
When the Camera Roll→Places function is selected within iPhones, the map now displays the new location created by modifying the latitude and longitude coordinates.
We can validate the timestamp-reset and coordinate modification using the same steps as we followed in experiment 1.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In both experiments the outcomes proved successful. In both cases the coordinates of the two images were modified, as were the associated MAC timestamps and then successfully copied back onto the iPhone. We recovered no artefacts from the iPhone. However, artefacts were created on the Ubuntu and Windows machines.
The deletion of files left no artefacts on the iPhone operating system (certainly not through investigation using XRY), however it may be possible to recover such artefacts using the Zdiarski method [22, 23] , due to it making a bitby-bit copy of the user partition. A discussion of this technique for recovering forensic artefacts within the current context is outside of the scope of this paper and it may be worth considering for future development of this work.
The only exception to this rule was in Experiment 2, where the "Last Modified" timestamp was not changed. The reason for this was that all of the other images in the iTunes Backup folder had that timestamp, so it seemed correct that it should be the same as those. This was created during the creation of the backup files. All of the backup files, with their alphanumeric hex file names are copies of those on the device but are renamed, hence the new timestamp. The impact of this is that the modified image has metadata that has timestamps matching those of the other images in the backup folder.
There are numerous ways in which this research can be taken forward. It was recently reported that the iPhone stores geo-tags relating to an individual's every movement [24] . One way in which the current research is being taken forward is to establish whether this can be modified en-masse.
